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This paper develops the collective marriage matching model, a
behavioral and empirically ￿ exible framework that incorporates both
marriage matching and intrahousehold allocations. The model shows
how marriage market equilibrium and bargaining power within the
family are simultaneously determined. The framework provides a solu-
tion to the problem of incorporating substitute sex ratios in empirical
models of spousal labor supplies. Using data from the US 2000 census,
the empirical results show that changes in marriage market tightness,
the ratio of unmarried men to unmarried women, have large estimated
e⁄ects on spousal labor force participation rates, and smaller e⁄ects on
hours of work and hours in home production. Controlling for variation
in labor market conditions across marriage markets has substantive
implications for the parameter estimates.
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A well known ￿nding from recent empirical models of intrahousehold alloca-
tions is that marriage market conditions a⁄ect intrahousehold allocations.1
Simultaneously, other researchers have investigated empirical models of mar-
riage matching or choice of living arrangements more broadly.2 As Lundberg
and Pollak (1996) have observed, an open problem is to integrate these two
lines of research.
The primary contribution of this paper is to develop the collective mar-
riage matching model, a behavioral and empirically ￿ exible framework that
incorporates both marriage matching and intrahousehold allocations.3 We
use the collective model of intrahousehold allocation developed by Chiappori
(1992, 1998) and his collaborators. The attractive feature of the collective
model is that it is empirically tractable and it provides testable restrictions
on behavior while minimizing strong functional form assumptions. We em-
bed a collective model within the Choo Siow (Choo Siow 2006; hereafter
CS) marriage matching model. CS does not impose any a priori restriction
on the marriage matching distribution. Except for thin cells, it can ￿t any
observed cross section marriage matching distribution.
Our version of the collective model allows for public goods following Blun-
dell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005; hereafter BCM), e¢ cient spousal risk shar-
ing, and continuous/discrete spousal labor supply behavior. Our framework
shows how the estimate of the e⁄ect of marriage market conditions on the
labor force participation of married women is informative on the relative
bargaining power of married women who work versus those who do not.
In the marriage market, individuals choose whether to remain unmar-
ried or who to marry and their living arrangement. The utility weights of
husbands relative to their wives in the collective model are used to clear the
marriage market. We show the existence of marriage market equilibrium.
The transferable utilities marriage market model, for example Becker (1991)
and CS, is a special case of our collective model of marriage matching. In
the collective tradition, Chiappori, Lacroix and Fortin (2002; hereafter CFL)
and BCM are other special cases.
To keep our paper to a manageble length, we defer structural estimation
1See, for example, Angrist (2002), Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), Francis
(2005), Grossbard-Schectman (1984, 1993), Lafortune (2008).
2E.g. Black, et. al. (2003); Baker, et. al. (2001), Lillard, et. al. (2006).
3An alternative formulation is Del Boca and Flinn (2006).
1and testing of our collective marriage matching model to our companion pa-
per, Choo, Seitz, and Siow, 2008; hereafter CSS. Our empirical contribution
here is more limited. We exploit our theoretical structure to provide a so-
lution to the problem of accounting for substitution e⁄ects when estimating
the reduced form impact of marriage market conditions on spousal labor sup-
plies. Currently, a researcher constructs an own sex ratio based on the type
of husbands and wives whose labor supplies the researcher is studying. The
researcher ignores the sex ratios of other types of men and women due to the
problem of multicollinearity.4 Of course ignoring substitute sex ratios makes
it di¢ cult to interpret existing empirical results. Our model provides a po-
tential solution to this problem, a su¢ cient statistic for the marriage market
condition facing any type i men and type j women. We call this statistic
marriage market tightness, which is the ratio of unmarried men of type i to
unmarried women of type j.5 Substitution e⁄ects are embedded in marriage
market tightness because the presence of substitutes will a⁄ect tightness.
Unlike sex ratios, marriage market tightness is an endogenous variable and
this endogeneity has to be dealt with.
We estimate the e⁄ect of market tightness on two elements of household
behavior. First, we estimate models of household labor supply using the
2000 Census where each state is treated as a separate marriage market. Sec-
ond, we estimate models of hours spent in home production using the 2003
American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Our estimation results are presented in
Section 5. After controlling for labor market conditions, state e⁄ects, and in-
dividual characteristics, marriage market tightness is negatively (positively)
correlated with wives￿(husbands￿ ) labor supplies and hours in home produc-
tion. A one standard deviation increase in marriage market tightness leads
to more than a one quarter standard deviation decrease (increase) in wives￿
(husbands￿ ) log odds of participating in the labor market. The e⁄ects on
usual hours of work per week and annual weeks worked are quantitatively
smaller. Thus changes in marriage market tightness have quantitatively sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ects on intrahousehold reallocations in the direction predicted by
our theory. Controlling for labor market conditions changes the parameters
estimates substantially. To deal with the endogeneity issue, we instrument
tightness for each fi;jg match in each state with the birth rates and parental
4The problem of how many prices of substitutes or complements to include in the
estimation of demand and supply functions are of course well known.
5Seitz (2004) was the ￿rst to discuss marriage market tightness.
2educational attaintment at birth of the i and j individuals in that state. Con-
trolling for endogeneity of market tightness is more important for the labor
supplies of husbands than for the labor supplies of wives. Adding individ-
ual e⁄ects do not change the point estimates of tightness on spousal labor
supplies.
In addition to spousal labor supplies, we also investigate the e⁄ect of
tightness on other intrahousehold time use measures including leisure and
hours spent on home production. Due to the small sample sizes, our empirical
foray using time use data is at best suggestive. Most of the estimated signs
are consistent with the theory. Thus the time use results adds to the evidence
that marriage market conditions a⁄ect intrahousehold allocation of time use.
But the large standard errors preclude any de￿nite conclusion about the
magnitudes of the e⁄ects.
In our companion paper CSS, we show that the parameters of the sharing
rule in CFL are identi￿ed with marriage matching data. The substantive
restriction in CFL is that it does not admit household public goods. As a
consequence, CFL and CSS apply the empirical framework to couples without
children. Without public goods, equilibrium household labor supplies can
be decentralized into each spouse maximizing their own utility subject to
their own wage and a share of non-labor assets (the ￿sharing rule￿ ). This
decentralization results in spousal indirect utilities which are functions of own
wages and shares of non-labor assets. In the marriage market, individuals
base their marital decisions on comparing the spousal indirect utilities that
they can obtain from di⁄erent marital choices. Changes in shares of non-
labor assets via changes in the sharing rule will a⁄ect the level of spousal
utility obtained in a particular marital match. From this paper, we know
that the sharing rule adjusts to equilibrate the marriage market. CSS shows
that the determinants of such equilibrium sharing rules are identi￿ed from
marriage matching data. We exploit the simple indirect utilities from the
CFL framework to estimate marital choice models.
CSS shows that the consideration of marriage matching introduces new
determinants of sharing rule to the collective framework which has not be
emphasized before. These new determinants are alternative wages and non-
labor incomes from alternative marital choices. Unlike the standard collective
model which is silent on how own wages and non-labor incomes a⁄ect the
sharing rule, CSS imposes apriori restrictions on how own wages and non-
labor incomes, as well as alternative wages and non-labor incomes should
a⁄ect the sharing rule.
3Also using data from the 2000 census, the empirical part of CSS shows
that estimates from marriage matching data are more consistent with the col-
lective marriage matching model than estimates using spousal labor supplies
data following CFL.
This paper and CSS are ￿rst passes at integrating empirical marriage
matching with intrahousehold allocations and we have left out many relevant
complications. We will suggests some extensions in the conclusion of the
paper. Siow (forthcoming) surveys the research program.
2 The Model
Consider a society in which there are I types of men, i = 1;::;I, and J
types of women, j = 1;::;J. Let mi be the number of type i men and fj be
the number of type j women, and M and F are the vectors of the numbers
of each type of men and women, respectively. The type of an individual is
de￿ned by his or her preferences and ex-ante opportunities.
The model has two stages. In the ￿rst stage, individuals choose whether
to marry and who to marry. An fi;jg marriage is a marriage between a type
i man and a type j woman. At the time of marriage, wages and non-labor
incomes for each marital choice are random variables. In the second stage,
wages and non-labor income for each household are realized and household
labor supplies and public and private consumption allocations are chosen.
The rationale for including public good consumption within marriage is to
capture resources allocated to children in the marriage.
Let Cij (cij) be the private consumption of the wife (husband), Kij the
household￿ s expenditures on public goods and Hij (hij) the wife￿ s (husband￿ s)
labor supply. We normalize the total amount of time for each individual to
1. Preferences for the wife and husband are described by:
Uij[￿ij(Cij;1 ￿ Hij);Kij] + ￿ij + "ij;
and
uij[!ij(cij;1 ￿ hij);Kij] + ￿ij + ￿ij;
respectively. The felicity functions, Uij(:) and uij(:), depend on i and j to
allow for di⁄erences in home production technologies across di⁄erent types
of marriages. We will assume that the felicity functions are weakly separable
in public good expenditures. The rationale for weak separability will become
apparent later.
4The invariant gains to an fi;jg marriage for the women and men, ￿ij
and ￿ij respectively, shift utility according to the type of marriage and allow
the model to ￿t the observed marriage matching patterns in the data. Al-
though invariant gains vary across di⁄erent types of marriage, an important
restriction is that ￿ij and ￿ij are additively separable from consumption and
leisure.
We further assume "ij and ￿ij are random variables realized before mar-
riage decisions are made. The realizations of these random variables allow
di⁄erent individuals of the same type to make di⁄erent marital choices. "ij
is independent of Cij, Hij, Kij and also ￿ij. We assume that "ij or ￿ij do not
depend on the speci￿c identity of the spouse so that an individual will treat
all potential spouses of the same type as perfect substitutes. This will allow
us to use competitive marriage market clearing as our equilibrium concept.
If a woman chooses not to marry, then i = 0 and if a man chooses not to
marry, j = 0.
2.1 The collective model with e¢ cient risk sharing6
The objective of this section is to derive two results. First, we will show
how e¢ cient risk sharing a⁄ects the expected felicities of the spouses as
bargaining power within the household changes. Second, we will establish
conditions under which the wife will on average work more and the husband
will on average work less as the bargaining power of the husband increases.7
We start ￿rst with the household consumption and labor supply decisions in
the second stage. Wages and nonlabor incomes are assumed to be speci￿c
to the match. Consider a husband and wife in an fi;jg marriage. In this
section, we will hold the match, fi;jg, ￿xed and therefore dispense with the
fi;jg subscripts.
Before marriage, W, w and A, which are the components of wages and
nonlabor incomes common to all individuals in fi;jg matches, are observed.
However, total non-labor family income (A), the wife￿ s wage (W) and the
husband￿ s wage (w) have random components (￿A, ￿W, and ￿w, respectively)
6The collective model with public goods builds on BCM. E¢ cient intrahousehold risk
sharing builds on Chiappori 1999.
7This section considers only interior solutions for hours of work. An extension to the
labor force participation decision, and other extensions, will be discussed in Section 4. See
also Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir (2007).
5that are not realized until after the marriage decision is made:
A = A + ￿
A
W = W + ￿
W
w = w + ￿
w:
Let Z be the vector of parameters which characterize the joint distribution













subject to the family budget constraint
c + C + K ￿ A + WH + wh;
where EZ is the expectations operator. In problem (P1), the planner chooses
family consumption and labor supplies to maximize the weighted sum of the
wife￿ s and the husband￿ s expected felicities subject to their family budget
constraint. The weight allocated to the husband￿ s expected felicity is denoted
by p, p 2 R+, where p > 1 implies the husband has more weight than the wife
and vice versa. We will refer to p as the husband￿ s power in an fi;jg marriage.
The social planner takes p as given when solving the second stage household
problem. The determination of p itself occurs in the marriage market and
is a central focus of this paper. When the intrahousehold allocation is the
solution to problem (P1), the allocation is e¢ cient.
Let Q(p;Z) and q(p;Z) be the expected indirect felicity functions of the
wife and the husband, respectively. Appendix A shows that the solution to
problem (P1) implies:
Proposition 1 The changes in spousal expected utilities as the husband￿ s







The wife￿ s expected utility falls and the husband￿ s expected utility in-
creases as p increases. Equation (1) traces the redistribution of spousal ex-
pected utilities as the husband￿ s power increases. We will now study how
6spousal labor supplies change as husband￿ s power changes. A necessary con-
dition for solving problem (P1) is that given realized wages and non-labor
income the planner solves:
max
C;c;H;h;K
U[￿(C;1 ￿ H);K] + pu[!(c;1 ￿ h);K] (P2)
subject to
c + C + K ￿ A + WH + wh:
Denote H￿(p;W;w;A) and h￿(p;W;w;A) as the labor supplies for the wife
and husband that result from solving (P2), for a given p;W;w;A. In general,
it is di¢ cult to determine analytically how spousal labor supplies respond to
changes in p. Building on BCM, assume that an individual￿ s felicity function
is weakly separable in private goods (consumption and leisure) and the public
good. Appendix B shows that by restricting leisure (with suitably de￿ned
individual private income) and the public good to be normal goods for each
spouse:
Proposition 2 The wife￿ s labor supply is increasing in p whereas the hus-
band￿ s labor supply is decreasing in the husband￿ s power, p:
@H￿(p;W;w;A)
@p
> 0 8 W;w;A; (2)
@h￿(p;W;w;A)
@p
< 0 8 W;w;A: (3)
Equations (2) and (3) are expected. Problem (P2) is a unitary model of
the family faced with nonlabor income A and wages W, w. Thus we cannot
reject a unitary model of the family for fi;jg couples in the same society if
they share risk e¢ ciently. For example, spousal labor supplies of di⁄erent
fi;jg couples will satisfy Slutsky symmetry in response to di⁄erent wage real-
izations. We will discuss the relationship between our risk sharing collective
model and the deterministic collective model such as CFL in Section 4.2.
2.2 Marriage decisions in the ￿rst stage
Following CS, in the ￿rst stage agents decide whether to marry and who
to marry if they choose to marry. We will use the additive random utility
model to model this choice. Consider a particular woman of type j. Recall
7that she can choose between I types of men and whether or not to marry,
I + 1 alternatives in total. A particular man of type i can choose between
J types of women and whether or not to marry, J + 1 alternatives in total.
The expected indirect utility from an fi;jg marriage for a woman is:
V ij(pij;Zij;"ij) = Qij(pij;Zij) + ￿ij + "ij; i = 0;::I (4)
where i = 0 means that she chooses to be unmarried.
The indirect utility from an fi;jg marriage for a man is:
vij(pij;Zij;￿ij) = qij(pij;Zij) + ￿ij + ￿ij; j = 0;::;J (5)
and j = 0 means that he chooses to be unmarried.
Each individual draws an independent realization of the random compo-
nent for each possible type of match he or she could enter and for remaining
single. For a particular woman, let "j = ["0j;::;"ij;::;"Ij] denote the realiza-
tions of the shocks and G("j) denotes the joint density of "j. Likewise for a
man, let ￿i = [￿i0;::;￿ij;::;￿iJ] denote the realizations of shocks and g("i) de-
notes the joint density of ￿i. The expected indirect utility from the female￿ s
optimal choice will satisfy:
V
￿
("j) = max[V 0j(p0j;"0j;Z0j);:::;V ij(pij;"ij;Zij);:::;
V Ij(pIj;"Ij;ZIj)] (6)




2.3 The Marriage Market
Let p be the matrix of husband￿ s powers where a typical element is pij for
i;j ￿ 1. Under the assumption that there are many women and men of each
type, the random vectors "j and ￿i are independent of p. Assume further
that "j and ￿i are independent of all wages and assets in the society. Let
￿ij(p) denote the probability that a woman of type j will choose a spouse
of type i, i = 0;::I. Since each woman of type j is solving the same spousal
8choice problem (6),
￿ij(p) = Pr[Rij(i;i
0;j;"ij) > 0 8i









G("j) d"ij d"i06=ij (9)
where
Rij(i;i
0;j;"ij) = Qij(pij;Zij) + ￿ij ￿ Qi0j(pi0j;Zi0j) ￿ ￿i0j + "ij:
When there are fj type j women, the number of type j women who want to
choose type i spouses, i = 0;::;I is approximated by
￿ij(p;fj) = ￿ij(p)fj:








￿ 0; i0 = i
￿ 0; i0 6= i (10)
where ￿ij(p;fj) is the demand function by type j women for type i husbands.
Equation (10) says that the demand function satis￿es the weak gross substi-
tute assumption. That is, the demand by type j women for type i husbands,
i ￿ 1, is weakly decreasing in pij and weakly increasing in pi0j, i0 6= i. Such a
result is expected. All other types of potential spouses, i0 6= i, are substitutes
for type i spouses. When the bargaining power of type i spouses increase,
demand for that type of spouse is expected to weakly fall and the demand
for other types of spouses is expected to weakly increase.
Similarly, let ￿ij(p) denote the probability that a man of type i will choose
a spouse of type j, j = 0;::J. Since each man of type i is solving the same
spousal choice problem (7),
￿ij(p) = Pr(r(j;j
0;i;￿ij) > 0 8j












0;i;￿ij) = qij(pij;Zij) + ￿ij ￿ qij0(pij0;Zij0) ￿ ￿ij0 + ￿ij:
9When there are mi number of type i men, the number of type i men who
want to choose type j spouses, j = 0;::;J is approximated by
￿
ij(p;mi) = ￿ji(p)mi:









￿ 0; j0 = j
￿ 0; j0 6= j (12)
where ￿ij(p;mi) is the demand function by type i men for type j wives.
Marriage market clearing requires the supply of wives (husbands) to be
equal to the demand (husbands) for wives for each type of marriage:
￿
ij = ￿ij = ￿ij 8 fi > 0; j > 0g (13)
There are feasibility constraints that the stocks of married and unmarried
agents of each gender and type cannot exceed the aggregate stocks of agents
of each gender in the society:








We can now de￿ne a rational expectations equilibrium. There are two
parts to the equilibrium, corresponding to the two stages at which decisions
are made by the agents. The ￿rst corresponds to decisions made in the
marriage market; the second to the intra-household allocation. In equilib-
rium, agents make marital status decisions optimally, the sharing rules clear
each marriage market, and conditional on the sharing rules, agents choose
consumption and labor supply optimally. Formally:
De￿nition 3 A rational expectations equilibrium consists of a distribution of
males and females across individual type, marital status, and type of marriage
f^ ￿0j; ^ ￿i0; ^ ￿ijg, a set of decision rules for marriage, a set of decision rules for






ij(￿)g, and a matrix of husbands￿powers p￿ such
that:
101. Marriage decisions solve (6) and (7), obtaining fV ￿("j);v￿(￿i)g.
2. All marriage markets clear implying (13), (14), (15) hold;






Theorem 4 A rational expectations equilibrium exists.
Sketch of proof: We have already demonstrated (1) and (3). So what
needs to be done is to show that there is a matrix of husbands￿powers, p￿
which clears the marriage market. Consider a matrix of admissible husband￿ s
powers p. For every marriage fi;jg excluding i = 0 or j = 0, de￿ne the excess
demand function for marriages by men:
Dij(p) = ￿
ij(p) ￿ ￿ij(p) (16)
The demand and supply functions, ￿
ij(p) and ￿ij(p), for every type of mar-
riage ij, satisfy the weak gross substitute property, (10) and (12). So the
excess demand functions also satisfy the weak gross substitute property. Mas-
Colell, Winston and Green (1995: p. 646, exercise 17.F.16C) provide a proof
of existence of market equilibrium when the excess demand functions sat-
isfy the weak gross substitute property. For convenience, we reproduce their
proof in our context in Appendix 3.8 Our collective model of marriage match-
ing shows that the transferable utilities model of the marriage market can
be generalized to non-transferable utilities where the marginal utilities of
consumption are not constant.9
2.4 The logit spousal choice model
The rest of the paper concerns some empirical implications of the above
model. From here on, we will assume the logit random utility model, that
"ij and ￿ij are iid extreme value random variables. In this case, McFadden
(1974) showed that for every type of woman j, the relative demand for type
i husbands is:
ln￿ij ￿ ln￿0j = (￿ij ￿ ￿0j) + Qij(pij;Z) ￿ Q0j(Z0j) ; i = 1;::;I (17)
8Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the ￿rst to use the gross substitute property to
demonstrate existence in matching models.
9See also Legros and Newman (2007).
11where ￿ij is the number of fi;jg marriages demanded by j type females
and ￿0j is the number of type j females who choose to remain unmarried.
Similarly, for every type of man i, the relative demand for type j wives is:
ln￿
ij ￿ ln￿i0 = (￿ij ￿ ￿i0) + qij(pij;Zij) ￿ qi0(Zi0); j = 1;::;J; (18)
where ￿
ij is the number of fi;jg marriages supplied by j type males and ￿i0
is the number of type i males who choose to remain unmarried.
When the marriage market clears, ￿ij = ￿






(￿ij ￿ ￿0j) + Qij(pij;Zij) ￿ Q0J(Z0j)
2
+
(￿ij ￿ ￿i0) + qij(pij;Zij) ￿ qi0(Zi0)
2
(19)
CS calls the left hand side of (19), which is observed, the total gains to
an fi;jg marriage. Total gains is the average of the log odds of type i males
marrying type j females relative to them not marrying, and of type j females
marrying type i males relative to them not marrying. The right hand side of
(19) is equal to the average of the spouses￿expected payo⁄s from an fi;jg
marriage relative to not marrying. If the average log odds of marrying are
high, then total gains to marriage are large which should be expected.
In CS, which assumes transferable utilities, a change in pij have exactly
equal and opposite impact on the husband￿ s and wife￿ s utilities. Thus in CS,
changes in pij do not a⁄ect total gains. Unlike CS, the total gains to marriage
in (19) depends on pij, husband￿ s power. In the case considered here, with
diminishing marginal utilities of consumption, total gains depends on pij.
3 Implications of the theory for reduced form
labor supply estimation
In our companion paper (hereafter CSS) we establish formal identi￿cation
of the structural parameters from observations on family labor supplies and
marriage matching patterns in at least two marriage markets. Here, we
will use the theory to provide a solution to the problem of accouting for
12substitute sex ratios in estimating the reduced form impact of sex ratios on
labor supplies for married couples.





= (￿ij ￿ ￿0j) + Qij(pij;Zij) ￿ Q0J(Z0j) (20)
￿ ((￿ij ￿ ￿i0) + qij(pij;Zij) ￿ qi0(Zi0))
where Tij is the log of the ratio of the number of unmarried type i men to
unmarried type j women. This measure of marriage market tightness, or
the net gain of the wife relative to her husband, is used in our empirical
analysis in place of the aggregate ratio of men to women. Market tightness
for an fi;jg match in a market s is determined by two components of the
matching environment. The ￿rst component is the invariant gains to entering
an fi;jgrelative to remaining unmarried. The higher the invariant gains to
marriage, the greater is market tightness for fi; jg matches. The second
component depends on the indirect utility derived from an fi;jg match in
society s relative to remaining unmarried. As the relative indirect utility
from an fi;jg marriage increases, tightness is predicted to increase.
Equation (20) is a fundamental equilibrium relationship in the marriage
market, a direct implication of marriage market clearing. It is the basis of
the empirical content of marriage matching on the collective model in this
paper. It is important to emphasize two points. First, market tightness (Tij)
is a function of the husband￿ s power (pij) which is determined in marriage
market equilibrium will thus depend on conditions in every other type of
match an individual could have entered. Thus, market tightness depends
on the labor market and marriage market conditions for all other types of
matches. Second, Tij and pij are both endogenous variables and simultane-
ously determined, thus equation (20) is not a statement about the causal
e⁄ect of Tij on pij.
Then invert equation (20) to derive an expression for the husband￿ s power:
pij = gij(Tij;￿ij;￿0j;￿ij;￿i0;Zij;;Z0j;Zi0): (21)
Equation (21), which is useful here, is not a reduced form equation be-
cause Tij, an endogenous variable, is on the right hand side. CSS derives the
reduce form equation for pij which we will use for estimation there.
13We now use equation (21) to derive empirical implications of our theory
regarding the e⁄ect of marriage matching on spousal labor supplies. Let Hs
ij
be the hours of work of a wife of type j in an ij marriage in society s.




In what follows, we derive an empirical counterpart to equation (22), as well
as the labor supply equation for husbands. To start, notice that the female￿ s
labor supply depends on four components, the husband￿ s power (pij), the
wages of both spouses (Wij, wij) and the couple￿ s total nonlabor income
(Aij). The latter three are observed in the data, but pij is not observed.





Labor market determinants as well as match speci￿c wages and assets
a⁄ects the wife￿ s labor supply. Since we do not have instruments for the
idiosyncratic componetns of individual level wages and assets, we will average
the labor supplies in society s to get a mean labor supply equation for type












Similarly, the mean labor supply equation for all type i husbands in fi;jg

















across societies to estimate (23) and (24).
Equations (23) and (24) do not include individual spousal wages or non-
labor incomes as covariates. The theory implies that the individual labor
supply responses to spousal wages should satisfy Slutsky symmetry. How-
ever, this restriction cannot be tested with mean labor supply by fi;j;sg,
which is used here. We do not use individual level data because wages and
non-labor income are measured with error and we do not have instruments
for the idiosyncratic component of individual wages and non-labor income.
14Systematic components cannot be used as instruments to test Slutsky sym-
metry because the systematic components are known at the time of marriage,
and therefore a⁄ect husband￿ s power ps
ij, and are also collinear with Zs
ij.
It is also convenient at this point to discuss empirical tests of the sta-
tic collective model using spousal labor supplies such as CFL. In their pa-
per, they estimate restricted individual spousal labor supplies models where
the restrictions are derived from a static collective model. They instrument
spousal wages, children, and non-labor income with education, age, father￿ s
education, city size and religion. Di⁄erent values of these instruments de￿ne
di⁄erent types of individuals in di⁄erent regions. There is no instrument
which captures the transitory component of wages. Our interpretation of
their empirical results is that they provide evidence of (1) e¢ cient bargain-
ing between di⁄erent types of spouses and (2), spousal bargaining power
depends on the type of marriage matches as we assume in this paper. Their
empirical results are not informative about whether there is e¢ cient risk
sharing with the household as we suppose, or whether there is not as they
supposed. In order to empirically distinguish between whether there is e¢ -
cient risk sharing or not, one would need an instrument for transitory wage
shocks when one estimates individual spousal labor supplies equations. As
mentioned in Section 4.2, the results in this paper also do not shed light on
whether there is e¢ cient risk sharing or not.
A caveat on unobserved heterogeneity is necessary. If our observed matches
do not accord with the matches as perceived by market participants, then
the marriages in each observed match may contain mixtures of di⁄erent un-
observed marital matches. As labor market conditions and other exogenous
variables change, the mix of unobserved marital matches used to construct
observed market tightness and other variables may change. How these un-
observed resorting a⁄ects our results is unclear. This problem is not unique
to our paper. To the extent that changes in exogenous variables change the
composition of observed sex ratios, this problem a⁄ects all work this area.10
10For example, Angrist uses the sex ratio of immigrants as his measure of substitutes
which he argues was driven by immigration policy. Di⁄erences in immigration policies will
change the quality of mix of immigrants.
154 Model Extensions
4.1 Married women￿ s labor force participation rate
In addition to matching by individual types, a potential couple also has to
choose what kind of household to form. For example, they can marry or
cohabit. The spouses can choose participate in the labor force or not. Our
framework extends to choice of marital technologies and we will use it to
study the married women￿ s labor force participation rate here.
Let x denote specialized marriages where only the husband works and n
denote non-specialized marriages where both spouse work. Now a marriage
match is denoted by the tuple fi;j;tg where t = fn;xg. Noticing that the
number of unmarrieds in the same society, ￿i0 and ￿0j, are the same for both





































































































































































The economic content of (28) is as follows. After controlling for the
marital match fi;jg, changes in invariant gains, changes in labor market
conditions across two di⁄erent societies, if the change in the log odds of
specialized versus non-specialized marriages is positively correlated with the
change in tightness, px
ij > pn
ij and vice versa. Put another way, ceteris paribus,




Within a type of marriage, i.e. fi;j;tg, ceteris paribus, an increase in
husband￿ s power, pt
ij, implies that the husband￿ s expected utility is rising
and the wife￿ s expected utility is decreasing. But we cannot conclude that if
px
ij > pn
ij, wives in specialized marriages have less expected consumption or
utility than their working counterparts.
Working without uncertainty, Blundell, et. al. (2007) also discusses the
spousal labor force participation decision within the collective framework.
Their model di⁄ers from ours in the following substantive way. Using our
notation, they assume that an fi;jg couple take pij as exogenous. Given
fWij;wij;Aij;pij(Wij;wij;Aij)g, the couple e¢ ciently chooses which of them
should work and how much to work.11
Their participation model is nested in our setup. Section 2.1 assumes that
optimal labor supplies are always interior. But depending on pij, the speci￿-
cation of preferences, and on the realizations of wages and non-labor income
in the second period, some fi;jg households will choose to be specialized
and others will not. pij is the same for specialized versus non-specialized
households under this scenerio. Without uncertainty, all fi;jg households
will choose one choice over the other.
11Since they ignore the marriage decision and there is no uncertainty in their model, pij
is a function of Wij;wij;Aij.
17However even without wages and assets income uncertainty, this section
discussed an additional channel for specialization versus non-specialization
which is not covered in their model. That is, some fi;jg households will
to choose to enter specialized marriages and others will not as part of their
marital decisions. More importantly, px
ij and pn
ij. are pinned down in the
model as in equation (25).
4.2 One period marriage without uncertainty
Most of literature on the collective model deals with a static model of in-
trahousehold allocations without uncertainty. That is, wages and non-labor
income are known as of the time the individuals enter into the marriage. Our
marriage matching framework can accommodate this case and our structural
labor supply paper, CSS, studies this case.
Let observed wages, non-labor income and labor supplies be equal to true
wages, non-labor income and labor supplies plus measurement error:
f Wij = Wij + "
W￿
ij (29)
e wij = wij + "
w￿
ij (30)
e Aij = Aij + "
A￿
ij (31)
e Hij = Hij + "
L￿
ij (32)
e hij = hij + "
l￿
ij (33)






measurment errors which are uncorrelated with the true values. Marriages
are still identi￿ed by fi;j;￿g. Thus we can still use pij, the husband￿ s power,




b Q(Cij;1 ￿ Hij;Kij) + pijb q(cij;1 ￿ hij;Kij) (P1a)
subject to Cij + cij + Kij ￿ Aij + WijHij + wijhij 8 zij
(1), appropriately reinterpreted, continues to hold which is what is critical
for marriage market clearing. Thus as long as we can identify the type of
an individual and the marital matches that the individual can enter into,
18i.e. fi;jg, the empirical tests that we develop in this paper remain valid.
Di⁄erences in observed spousal labor supplies across fi;jg couples in the
same society are interpreted as due to di⁄erent realizations of measurement
errors across these couples.
Thus the empirical results in this paper should be interpreted with care.
Even if our empirical results are consistent with our model predictions, they
do not shed light on whether there is e¢ cient risk sharing within the family
or not.
In our reduced form regressions, we do not include individual spousal
wages as covariates. For every fi;jg match, we observe labor income and
labor supplies of multiple couples. Wages can be constructed by dividing
labor income by hours of work. But measurement error in labor supplies and
idiosyncratic labor supply shocks will induce variation in constructed wages
as discussed above. Since risk sharing in marriage, measurement error in
labor supplies, and idiosyncratic labor supply shocks are all salient factors in
our data, and we do not have instruments for the idiosyncratic components
of wages, we do not use constructed wages in our reduced form labor supply
estimates. Consequently, we do not take a stand on how much risk sharing
there is in our data.
Put in another light, the reduced form implications that we test in this
paper are independent of whether there is risk sharing or not. Similarly, our
results are also independent of whether there are public goods in marriage
or not.
In CSS, we will estimate this one period model without uncertainty or
public goods.
4.3 Home Production
In this section, we borrow results from BCM to extend our theoretical model
to incorporate home production and a distinction between leisure time and
time for work at home. Assume the household produces the public good
Kij at home using the production technology G(￿) which is a function of
purchased market inputs and time. The home production function is:
Kij = G(Xij;Lij;lij);
where Lij and lij are the hours of home production of the wife and husband,
respectively. The e¢ cient risk sharing arrangement in the collective model
19with home production is:
max
fC;c;XH;h;L;lg
E(b Q(Cij;1 ￿ Hij ￿ Lij;Kij)jZ)
+ pijE(b q(cij;1 ￿ hij ￿ lij;Kij)jZ)
subject to the family budget constraint
Xij + Cij + cij ￿ Aij + WijHij + wijhij:
BCMestablish identi￿cation of this model, including the function G(Xij;Lij;lij),
under the assumption that data on time use is available. The reader is re-
ferred to BCM for full details. The solution to the model yields demand
functions for private and public consumption expenditures, and labor sup-
plies for home and market work, each a function of wages, nonlabor income
and market tightness.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we estimate the reduced form of our structural model relating
marriage market tightness to spousal labor supplies in both market and home
production. We investigate the empirical relevance of three issues highlighted
by our theoretical model of marital matching and intra-household allocations:
(i) the role of marriage market substitutes, (ii) the endogeneity of market
tightness to labor market conditions, and (iii) heterogeneity in the marital
production technology.
5.1 Data
The data used in our analysis comes from two sources: the 5% sample from
the 2000 US Census and the 2003 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). The
Census data is used to construct measures of sex ratios, marriage market
tightness and labor market conditions in each marriage market and to es-
timate our reduced form labor supply regressions. The reduced form home
production regressions are estimated using time use data from the ATUS.
We de￿ne an individual￿ s type as a combination of race, age and educa-
tion. For each gender, there are four contiguous age categories of 5 years
each. The ages are slightly staggered across gender to re￿ ect the fact that
20men tend to marry slightly younger women. The youngest female and male
age categories, are 25-29 and 27-31 respectively. For each gender, we con-
sider two schooling categories: high school graduates (at least 12 and up
to and including 15 years of education) and college graduates (16 years of
education and higher). For each race and gender, there are 8 potential types
of individuals. Since we are only considering same race marriages, there are
potentially 64￿3 = 254 types of marital matches for each society.
We de￿ne each state as a separate society. With 50 states, there are
potentially 254 ￿ 50 = 12;700 cells across all marriage markets. However,
the majority of these potential cells (marital match ￿ state) have few or no
marriages. To avoid thin cell problems, we delete a cell if the number of
marriages in that cell is less than 5.12 For most OLS regressions, we have
about 2800 di⁄erent cells (marital match ￿ state), with about 180 distinct
marital matches. For IV regressions, we have about 2400 observations. Most
of the missing cells are due to non-white marriages, with large spousal age
di⁄erences, in states with small populations. There are 750,000 same race
couples in our Census sample before dropping the thin cell couples. After
dropping the thin cell couples, about 3,000 couples, our base Census sample
has approximately 747,000 couples. In other words, most of the thin cells
that we dropped were empty cells. We also exclude mixed race couples to
mitigate thin cells.13
Excluding thin cells from the empirical analysis should not a⁄ect the
consistency of our estimates. Our labor supplies regressions, (23) and (24),
have to hold for any subset of marital matches.
There is one selection criteria that is commonly imposed in the empirical
collective labor supply literature that we do not impose here, at least for the
labor supply regressions. Because we allow for public goods within marriage,
we do not restrict our analysis of labor supply to childless individuals or cou-
ples. In contrast, we only consider childless couples in our home production
model, as it is di¢ cult to distinguish between home production and leisure
for certain activities in households with children.
Market tightness for marital type fi;jg in state s is de￿ned as the log of
the ratio of the number of unmarried type i males to the number of unmarried
12We have other minor selection rules.
13Also market tightness for mixed race couples which include white spouses are very
di⁄erent from own race couples because there are so many more whites than other races
in the data. So we would need to have separate coe¢ cients on tightness for each mixed
race couples.
21type j females in state s.14
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample. Average tightness
across all marriages is -0.00278. Thus most couples choose marriage matches
in which the numbers of unmarried men and women are approximately equal.
The standard deviation is 0.542 which means that a signi￿cant number of
marriage matches have quite uneven tightness.
We use ￿ve measures of sex ratios. The most re￿ned measure is the sex
ratio measured at the cell level (log of the ratio of the number of males of type
i to the number of females of type j in state s). There are also sex ratios by
education matches and state, age matches and state, and race and state. For
all measures, across all individuals, mean sex ratios are approximately zero.
The standard deviations are relatively large for marital matches narrowly
de￿ned and also by education.
The individual data shows that most couples choose partners in which
mean tightness and sex ratio is approximately zero. However the standard
deviation is signi￿cant. Thus there should be su¢ cient variation in marital
matches to study their e⁄ect on spousal labor supplies.
Since we will analyze data at the cell level, Table 1 also shows, where an
observation is a cell, mean T s
ij is -0.129. The standard deviation has increased
to 0.962. The increase in the standard deviation should be expected since
each cell is an observation. Although most marriages occur around tightness
equal to zero, a signi￿cant number of marriages occur elsewhere. When each
cell is an observation, those marriages are responsible for the large standard
deviation in tightness at the cell level. But there are relatively few marriages
in the cells with tightness signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Similarly, the
standard deviations of sex ratios by cell is also large relative to those by
individuals.
At the cell level, about half the cells involve white marriages and the rest
are black and hispanic marriages.15 Mean ages by cell are between 35-39 for
women and 37-41 for men. For both gender, there are slightly more high
school graduates than college graduates.
To control for aggregate labor market conditions in an individual￿ s local
marriage market (i.e. Zs
ij, Zs
i0; Zs
0j), we de￿ne the following three variables to
characterize the earnings and non-labor income distributions. First, condi-
14An individual is unmarried if he or she is currently not married in the Census form
(not code 1 or 2).
15Again this is the di⁄erence between individual observations, where 80% of the mar-
riages are among white couples, and observations by cell.
22tional on positive annual labor earnings for a type of unmarried individual, we
construct the mean and standard deviation of log annual labor earnings for
the distribution of unmarried individuals (wage and salary income). The sec-
ond measure is the fraction of individuals with zero labor earnings for each
match type in each marriage market. Finally, we construct the analogous
variables for non-labor earnings, de￿ned from the Census as total personal
income minus wage and salary income.16 We do not use wages or non-labor
income for fi;jg couples in state s to avoid issues of simultaneity. So we are
assuming that the labor market and non-labor incomes of the unmarrieds in
a state span the wages and non-labor income distributions for that state.
Table 1 also contains information on the labor supply behavior of married
couples by cells in the 2000 Census. The labor force participation rates for
husbands and wives are 92% and 75%, respectively. We consider three mea-
sures of labor supply and one measure of home production in our empirical
analysis. Our ￿rst measure is the log odds of LFP (labor force participation).
Conditional on participating in the labor force, our second measure of labor
supply is the log of usual hours worked per week. Mean usual hours worked
for men and women were 45 and 34 hours respectively. Conditional on be-
ing in the labor force, the third measure is log weeks worked per year. Mean
weeks worked per year for men and women were 49 and 41 weeks respectively.
5.2 Determinants of market tightness
Table 2 presents summary estimates of market tightness (The point estimates
are in Appendix T1). This is our empirical estimate of T(￿s;￿s;Zs;Ms;F s).
There are a total of 2395 cells (state ￿ marital match) and each cell is one
observation. Column 1 regresses market tightness on state e⁄ects alone. The
p-value of the F-statistic shows that there is no evidence that state e⁄ects
alone explain market tightness. Column 2 adds our proxies for sex ratio at
birth data to the regression. The R2 jumps to 0.876. In otherwords, our sex
ratios at birth is a strong predictor of market tightness. This also means that
we should not have a weak instrument problem when we do IV regressions.
Column 3 adds labor market conditions to the regression. From the F tests,
both proxies for sex ratio at birth and labor market conditions separately
continue to a⁄ect market tightness. Finally in column 4, we add individual
16To be precise, we measure the fraction of individuals with non-positive non-labor
income rather than zero non-labor income.
23￿xed e⁄ects: age, education and race of each spouse. The individual ￿xed
e⁄ects, proxies for sex ratio at birth and labor market conditions all continue
to a⁄ect market tightness.
6 Substitution in marriage markets
As discussed in the introduction, substitution or spillover e⁄ects in the mar-
riage market a⁄ects the estimation of causal e⁄ects of sex ratios on spousal
labor supplies. Table 3 shows that this concern is a signi￿cant issue in our
data.
Di⁄erent columns in Table 3 presents summary statistics for reduced form
spousal labor supplies regressions on the own sex ratio, SRs
ij, sex ratios by
age and state, sex ratios by education and state, and sex ratios by race and
state, and other covariates. The ￿rst three columns estimate the reduced
forms by OLS. The last three columns assumes that the sex ratios by state
are endogenous and instruments the sex ratios with the birth rate instruments
from Table 1.
In addition to sex ratios, column 1 includes state e⁄ects as covariates.
The dependent variables include, for an fi;j;sg marriage, the log odds of the
spouse being in the labor market (log odds LFPR), log usual hours of work
per week (ln hrs/wk), and log weeks worked per year (ln wks/yr). For each
dependent variable and covariates, Table 3 presents the p-value of the F test
that the coe¢ cients of all the other sex ratios other than SRs
ij is di⁄erent
from zero. For the ￿rst dependent variable, log odds LFP of the wife, the
p-values in columns (1) to (6) are smaller than one percent. In other words,
all the other sex ratios also a⁄ect the labor force participation rate of the
wife. Thus it becomes di¢ cult to interpret what the estimated coe¢ cient on
SRs
ij in such a regression imply, particularly when all the di⁄erent sex ratios
are quite collinear. The estimated coe¢ cient on SRs
ij depends on what other
sex ratios are included.
The next dependent variable is ln hrs/wk of the wife. Here, the p-values
show that all the other sex ratios also a⁄ect hours of work per week at the
one percent signi￿cance level for columns (1), (2), (4) and (5). The p-values
are 0.06 in columns (3) and (6). In those two speci￿cations there is some
weak evidence that the other sex ratios do not matter.
Looking through the Table, 50 out of 60 speci￿cations show that, after
controlling for SRs
ij, the other sex ratios also a⁄ect spousal labor supplies
24at the one percent signi￿cance level. In most of the cases where we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the other sex ratios do not matter are in columns
(3) and (6) which include individual ￿xed e⁄ects for both spouses. In these
speci￿cations, the joint con￿dence intervals are large and there is little power
against the null hypothesis of no e⁄ect.
Thus the evidence in Table 3 strong suggests that substitution in marriage
markets a⁄ect spousal labor supplies, and that the estimated e⁄ect of SRs
ij on
spousal labor supplies depends critically on what other sex ratios are included
in the estimation. Ignoring the other sex ratios is not a satisfactory solution.
It is di¢ cult to interpret the estimated e⁄ect of SRs
ij alone on spousal labor
supplies when we know that substitution e⁄ects in the marriage market are
quantitatively important.
7 Wives￿labor supplies
Table 4a presents the estimated e⁄ects of T s
ij on log odds of LFP of wives.
Columns (1) to (3) present OLS estimates. Columns (4) to (6) present IV
estimates.
In addition to T s
ij, column (1) adds state e⁄ects as covariates. The es-
timated coe¢ cient on T s
ij is 0.232. It is statistically di⁄erent from zero at
the 1% level and has the ￿wrong sign￿ . Recall that the theory says that the
variation in T s
ij is a proxy for husband￿ s power after controlling for invariant
gains and labor market conditions. Column (1) does not control for labor
market conditions or invariant gains, except via state e⁄ects, nor does it
account for the endogeneity of T s
ij.
In column (2), we add state e⁄ects and labor market controls. In this case,
the estimated e⁄ect on T s
ij is -0.196 and it is also statistically signi￿cant at
the 1% level. So controlling for labor market conditions signi￿cantly changes
our estimated e⁄ect of T s
ij and in accord with direction predicted by out
theory. This switch in estimated sign between column (2) and column (1)
is consistent with our other estimates. In almost all cases, controlling for
state e⁄ects alone result in a wrong estimated sign for T s
ij. After controlling
for labor market conditions, the estimated sign for T s
ij is consistent with the
theory. This is true whether we instrument T s
ij or not. So, consistent with
our model, T s
ij is correlated with labor market conditions. Ignoring labor
market conditions in estimation will result in inconsistent estimates of the
e⁄ects of T s
ij on spousal labor supplies.
25The change in estimated sign between columns (1) and (2) suggests that
after controlling for state e⁄ects, supply shocks to the labor market dominate.
An exogenous increase in the supply of type j females will reduce T s
ij, and
reduce their wage and therefore their labor supplies throught a substitution
e⁄ect. This will induce a positive correlation between female labor supplies
and T s
ij if we do not control for the reduction in the wage which is what we
have in column (1). After we add labor market controls in column (2), the
estimated ￿wrong￿sign disappears.
Column (3) adds state e⁄ects, labor market controls and individual ￿xed
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.184 and again statistically di⁄erent
from zero at the 1% level. It is marginally di⁄erent from that in column (2).
Columns (4) to (6) are IV estimates. T s
ij is a⁄ected by variations in
invariant gains. Since we at best control for these variations with state
and individual e⁄ects, there are variations in invariant gains that we do not
control for. Instrumenting T s
ij with sex ratios at birth should mitigate the
endogenity problem. The point estimate of 0.330 in column (4), which only
includes state e⁄ects as the other covariates, shows that instrumenting T s
ij
is not su¢ cient to obtain a ￿right￿estimated sign. Column (5) adds state
e⁄ects and labor market conditions. In this case, the estimated coe¢ cient on
T s
ij is -0.176 and it is statistically di⁄erent from zero. The IV point estimate
in column (5) is slightly di⁄erent from the OLS estimate in column (3) but we
will not reject the hypothesis that they are the same using a Hausman test.
Put another way, the endogeneity of T s
ij is not a quantitatively signi￿cant
issue for estimation. This will be a consistent ￿nding in the rest of our
results.
Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions and individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.167 and the standard error is 0.065.
So the point estimate is similar to that without individual e⁄ects but the
standard error doubles. This fall in estimated precision is the same for the
other speci￿cations.
Using the point estimate of -0.176 in column (5) as a benchmark, a one
standard deviation increase in T s
ij will decrease the log LFP of wives by 0.26
standard deviation. Thus variations in tightness is quantitatively important
for explaining variations in the log LFP of wives across matchs and or soci-
eties.
A behavioral interpretation of our results is that, ceteris paribus, women
and men are more willing to enter into marriages where the wife does not work
when T s
ij increases. Using our discussion of female labor force participation
26rate in Section 25, the negative e⁄ect of T s
ij on log LFP of wives says that
ceteris paribus, husbands￿power is larger in households where their wives do
not work compared to households where their wives work.
By and large, the OLS estimates in columns (1) to (3) are similar to their
IV counterparts in columns (4) to (6). This suggests that endogeneity of T s
ij
due to labor demand shocks are not of ￿rst order importance. Recall that
we include state e⁄ects to control for state level labor demand shocks.
Table 4b presents estimates of the e⁄ect of T s
ij on ln hrs/week of wives.
Column (1) adds state e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij has the wrong sign
and is statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Column (2) adds state
e⁄ects and labor market conditions. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.026 and
the estimated standard error is 0.004. So as in Table 4a, adding labor market
conditions changes the estimated sign on T s
ij. The estimated magnitude is
smaller than for log odds LFP. Column (3) adds state e⁄ects, labor market
conditions and individual e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.024 and
the estimated standard error is 0.005. So adding individual e⁄ects do not
changed the estimated e⁄ect on T s
ij.
Columns (4) to (6) are IV estimates. As before, state e⁄ects alone in
Column (4) results in a wrong estimated sign. Column (5) adds state e⁄ects
and labor market conditions. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.028 and the
estimated standard error is 0.005. This estimate is similar to the OLS es-
timate. Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions, individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.044 and the standard error is 0.010.
Thus adding individual e⁄ects lower the estimated precision on T s
ij. The es-
timates in Table 4b is qualitatively similar to their counterparts in Table 4a.
The estimated magnitudes on ln hrs/wk are smaller than for participation.
Using the estimate in column (5) as a benchmark, a one standard devia-
tion increase in T s
ij results in 0.065 standard deviation decrease in ln hrs/wk.
So variation in tightness explains less of the variation in mean log usual hours
of work per week across matches and or societies.
Table 4c presents estimates of the e⁄ect of T s
ij on ln wks/yr of wives.
Column (1) adds state e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij has the wrong sign
and is statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Column (2) adds state
e⁄ects and labor market conditions. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.023 and
the estimated standard error is 0.005. So as in Table 4a and 4b, adding labor
market conditions changes the estimated sign on T s
ij. Column (3) adds state
e⁄ects, labor market conditions and individual e⁄ects. The point estimate
on T s
ij is -0.016 and the estimated standard error is 0.007.
27Columns (4) to (6) are IV estimates. As before, state e⁄ects alone in
Column (4) results in a wrong estimated sign. Column (5) adds state e⁄ects
and labor market conditions. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.022 and the
estimated standard error is 0.007. This estimate is similar to the OLS es-
timate. Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions, individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.014 and the standard error is 0.014.
Thus adding individual e⁄ects lower the estimated precision on T s
ij until it
is no longer statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. The point estimates in
Table 4c are quantitatively similar to their counterparts in Table 4b. The
estimated standard errors are larger.
Using the estimate in column (5) as a benchmark, a one standard devia-
tion increase in T s
ij results in 0.038 standard deviation decrease in ln wks/yr.
So variation in tightness explains even less of the variation in mean log weeks
worked per year of wives across matches and or societies.
For all three measures of labor supplies, it is important to control for
labor market conditions to obtain consistent estimates of the e⁄ect of T s
ij on
the wives￿labor supplies. The IV point estimates are not signi￿cantly di⁄er-
ent from OLS estimates. Although individual e⁄ects explain labor supplies,
including them do not a⁄ect the estimated e⁄ects of T s
ij.
Comparing results for the three di⁄erent measures of wives￿labor supplies,
the qualitative impact of changes in tightness on spousal labor supplies are
the same for all three measures. The quantitative magnitude is largest for
participation and lowest for weeks worked per year, with hours per week in
between. Due to changes in tightness, wives adjust their hours per week
more than weeks worked per year. The relative large quantitative e⁄ect
on participation suggests that not working is not simply more leisure. It is
consistent with our view that participation is a choice between specialized and
non-specialized home production and not just a redistribution of resources
with a ￿xed marital technology.
If we use SRs
ij instead of T s
ij as a covariate in the regressions in Table 4,
the point estimates on SRs
ij are quantitatively similar to that for T s
ij in their
respective speci￿cations. Thus empirically, the estimated e⁄ects of SRs
ij on
spousal labor supplies are similar to that of T s
ij. However the interpretations
are very di⁄erent. When we use T s
ij as a covariate and estimate its e⁄ect
consistently, we recognize that it is an endogenous variable. We can calculate
the e⁄ect of an exogenous variable on spousal labor supplies after calculating
its e⁄ect on tightness. When SRs
ij is used as a covariate, the standard practice
is to use the point estimate as a causal estimate of the e⁄ect of SRs
ij on
28spousal labor supplies which is incorrect. As Table 3 points out, the estimated
e⁄ect depends on what other sex ratios are included.
8 Husbands￿labor supplies
Table 5a presents the estimated e⁄ects of T s
ij on log odds of LFP of husbands.
Columns (1) to (3) present OLS estimates. Columns (4) to (6) present IV
estimates.
In addition to T s
ij, column (1) adds state e⁄ects as covariates. The esti-
mated coe¢ cient on T s
ij is -0.018. It is not statistically di⁄erent from zero at
the 5% level.
In column (2), we add state e⁄ects and labor market controls. In this case,
the estimated e⁄ect on T s
ij is 0.067 and it is statistically signi￿cant at the
5% level. So controlling for labor market conditions signi￿cantly changes our
estimated e⁄ect of T s
ij in accord with direction predicted by out theory. This
switch in estimated sign between column (2) and column (1) is consistent
with our other estimates. In almost all cases, controlling for state e⁄ects
alone result in a wrong estimated sign for T s
ij. The argument is the same
as in the wives￿case. Supply shocks dominate in the labor market after we
control for state level labor market conditions.
Column (3) adds state e⁄ects, labor market controls and individual ￿xed
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.015 and it is not statistically di⁄erent
from zero at the 5% level.
Columns (4) to (6) are IV estimates. The point estimate of T s
ij is -0.034
in column (4) which only includes state e⁄ects. Column (5) adds state e⁄ects
and labor market conditions. In this case, the estimated coe¢ cient on T s
ij
is 0.145 and it is statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 1% level. The IV
point estimate in column (5) is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the OLS estimate
in column (3). So there is some evidence that the endogeneity of T s
ij is a
quantitatively signi￿cant issue for estimation for husbands￿labor supplies.
This will be a consistent ￿nding in the rest of our results for husbands￿labor
supplies.
Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions and individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is 0.015 and the standard error is 0.072.
The point estimate is smaller than in column (5) and the standard error is
signi￿cantly larger. This fall in estimated precision is the same for the other
speci￿cations.
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standard deviation increase in T s
ij will decrease the log LFP of husbands by
0.53 standard deviation. Thus variations in tightness has a larger impact
on the log LFP of husbands than wives. This larger impact by standard
deviation is driven by the smaller standard deviation in log LFP of husbands
across cells. The quantitative estimate for husbands is actually smaller than
that for wives.
Table 5b presents estimates of the e⁄ect of T s
ij on ln hrs/week of husbands.
Column (1) adds state e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Column (2) adds state e⁄ects and labor
market conditions. The point estimate on T s
ij is -0.012 and the estimated
standard error is 0.003. So as in Table 5a, adding labor market conditions
changes the estimated sign on T s
ij. Column (3) adds state e⁄ects, labor
market conditions and individual e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is 0.004
and it is not statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level.
Columns (4) to (6) are IV estimates. As before, state e⁄ects alone in
Column (4) results in a estimate that is statistically not di⁄erent from zero.
Column (5) adds state e⁄ects and labor market conditions. The point esti-
mate on T s
ij is 0.018 and the estimated standard error is 0.003. This estimate
is larger than the OLS estimate. Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market
conditions, individual e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Thus adding individual e⁄ects lower the
estimated precision on T s
ij. The estimated elasticities on hrs/wk are smaller
than for participation.
Using the estimate in column (5) as a benchmark, a one standard devia-
tion increase in T s
ij results in 0.068 standard deviation increase in ln hrs/wk.
So variation in tightness explains less of the variation in mean log usual hours
of work per week of husbands than participation.
Table 5c presents estimates of the e⁄ect of T s
ij on ln wks/yr of husbands.
Column (1) adds state e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Column (2) adds state e⁄ects and la-
bor market conditions. The point estimate on T s
ij is again not statistically
di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Column (3) adds state e⁄ects, labor
market conditions and individual e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is also
not statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level.
Columns (4) to (6) are IV estimates. As before, state e⁄ects alone in
Column (4) generates an estimate that is not statistically di⁄erent from zero
at the 5% level. Column (5) adds state e⁄ects and labor market conditions.
30The point estimate on T s
ij is 0.011 and the estimated standard error is 0.005.
This is the only speci￿cation which is statistically di⁄erent from zero at the
5% level. Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions, individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on T s
ij is not di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level.
Using the estimate in column (5) as a benchmark, a one standard devia-
tion increase in T s
ij results in 0.038 standard deviation increase in ln wks/yr.
So variation in tightness explains less of the variation in mean log weeks
worked per year of husbands than wks/yr or participation.
For all three measures of labor supplies, it is important to control for
labor market conditions to obtain consistent estimates of the e⁄ect of T s
ij on
the husbands￿labor supplies. Unlike the estimates for wives, the IV point
estimates for husbands￿are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the OLS estimates.
Thus controlling for endogeneity is important to obtain consistent estimates
for husbands. With T s
ij as a covariate, there is no gain to adding SRs
ij as a
covariate.
Similar to that for wives, the quantitative magnitude is largest for par-
ticipation and lowest for weeks worked per year, with hours per week in
between.
In general, estimates for husbands are less precise than that for wives
which may be due to the smaller variation in husbands￿labor supplies. Still
for all three labor supplies measures, we obtain the correct sign and point
estimates that are statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 1% and 5% level
in the estimates in column (5). This ￿nding compares favorably with other
studies on the e⁄ect of marriage market conditions on males￿labor supplies.
In general, they obtain imprecise results.
8.1 Robustness
To deal with the variable number of individual observations used to construct
mean values for di⁄erent cells, we also estimated the models by weighing the
data by marriage counts for each cell. The weighted results are similar to that
without weighting and therefore are not presented. There was no systematic
increase in the precision of the weighted estimates.
We also experimented with allowing the e⁄ects of tightness on spousal la-
bor supplies to di⁄er by fi;jg. Unfortunately, the proliferation of interaction
e⁄ects led to imprecise and uninterpretable empirical estimates. So although
the theory and empirical framework allows for heterogenous treatment re-
sponses, we are unable to usefully estimate these e⁄ects with the current
31data set.
We also experimented by dividing the sample into two samples, marriages
with kids and marriages without kids. The number of observerations for each
cell fell substantially, we lost more cells in the estimation, and the estimates
because substantially more imprecise for both samples.
In earlier drafts of this paper, we estimated the model using the individual
observations and clustering the standard errors by fi;j;sg. The estimates
were substantially more imprecise.
9 Time use results
Our time use data comes from the 2003 American Time Use Survey. While
the population surveyed is consistent with the 2000 census, the time use
survey has much less observations. Compared with our census sample of
746,963 individual observations, we only have 408 individual observations in
the time use survey. Table 6 compares the two surveys.
Our measure of home production, presented in Table 6 is the ￿total￿non-
market work de￿nition of Aguiar and Hurst (2007), minus shopping activities
(obtaining goods and services). In particular, an individual￿ s hours supplied
to home production is de￿ned as the total time spent on meals (preparation,
presentation, and cleanup), housework (interior cleaning, laundry, sewing, re-
pairing and maintaining textiles, storing interior household items including
food) and interior and exterior maintenance, repair, and decoration, vehicle
repair and maintenance, and appliance and tool set-up, repair, and mainte-
nance, household management (except mail and email), and lawn, garden,
houseplant and pet care. Our measure of home production does not include
time spent obtaining goods as services, as it is arguably more di¢ cult to dis-
entangle home production time and leisure time for both of these categories.
For similar reasons, we limit our analysis to couples with no children in the
household to abstract from decisions regarding time spent with children de-
cisions. On average, husbands supply 10 hours per week to home production
while wives supply 16 hours.
Table 7 contains regression results with the time use data. Due to the
small number of observations, we did not include state ￿xed e⁄ects. We
include labor market controls and race ￿xed e⁄ects. Consider ￿rst the esti-
mated e⁄ect of tightness on log hours of leisure per week of wives. Whether
we use sex ratio as a covariate, OLS or IV with tightness, the estimated
32signs are positive but statistically insigni￿cant due to the small number of
observations in the regressions. The positive signs are consistent with our
theory. The point estimates are implausibly large relative to those from the
equivalent labor supplies estimates.17
Row 2 presents estimates of the e⁄ect of tightness on the log hours of home
production per week of wives. The three estimates have negative signs but
again are not statistically signi￿cant. Again the negative signs are consistent
with our theory. The point estimates in this case are more plausible.
Turning to the results for husbands, row 3 presents estimates of the e⁄ect
of tightness on the log hours of leisure per week of husbands. Two estimates
have negative signs and one is a small positive estimate. The large standard
errors preclude any de￿nite conclusion.
Row 4 presents estimates of the e⁄ect of tightness on the log hours of
home production per week for husbands. All three estimates are positive.
The standard errors remain large but smaller than in row 3. These positive
estimates are consistent with the theory.
Due to the small sample sizes, our empirical foray using time use data
is at best suggestive. Most of the estimated signs are consistent with the
theory. Thus the time use results adds to the evidence that marriage mar-
ket conditions a⁄ect intrahousehold allocation of time use. But the large
standard errors preclude any de￿nite conclusion about the magnitudes of the
e⁄ects.
10 Conclusion
This paper presents a ￿ exible empirical framework which intergrates the col-
lective model of intrahousehold allocation with the CS model of marriage
matching. We use this framework to show how one can deal with the prob-
lem of including substitute sex ratios in estimating the e⁄ects of marriage
market conditions on spousal labor supplies. Finally, using data from the
2000 US census, the paper presents empirical evidence that substitute sex
ratios do a⁄ect spousal labor supplies, and how marriage market tightness
a⁄ects intrahousehold allocation of spousal labor supplies and time use which
are consistent with the theory.
17Even ignoring the small sample size, the results are not exactly comparable because
these time use estimates do not control for state e⁄ects.
33There is a lot of work which remains to be done. CSS estimates and
tests the CFL version of the model discussed here. How to empirically esti-
mate and test more general collective models in our framework needs to be
done. Extending the model to incorportate pre-marital investments is also
important (E.g. Chiappori, Iygun and Weiss (forthcoming); Peters and Siow
(2002)). Lifecycle considerations are also important (E.g. Choo and Siow
(2005)). The collective model is a complete contracting model of intrahouse-
hold allocation. There is substantial evidence that in certain contexts, the
complete contracting assumption is implausible. How we should extend this
framework to those contexts is an important avenue for further research.
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37A Proof of Proposition 1
Abstracting from i;j;g;G, the social planner solves:
max
fC;c;H;h;Kg
E(b Q(C;1 ￿ H;KjZ) + pE(b q(c;1 ￿ h;K)jZ)
subject to, for each state S,
c + C + K ￿ A + WH + wh (34)
Let Z￿ be the value of Z evaluated at the optimum. The ￿rst order conditions
with respect to c, C, H, h, K and the multiplier ￿ for each state S are:
b Q
￿
C = ￿ (35)
pb q
￿
c = ￿ (36)
b Q
￿
1￿H = ￿W (37)
pb q
￿
1￿h = ￿w (38)
b Q
￿
K + pb q
￿
K = ￿ (39)





































































Since (43) holds for every state S, (1) obtains.
38B Proof of @EH￿
@pij > 0 and @Eh￿
@pij < 0
For an fi;jg family, given realizations of wages and asset income, and taking
p as given, the planner solves a one period household maximization prob-
lem, P2. The objective of this appendix is to show that for any admissible
realization of wages and asset income, and taking p as ￿xed, labor supply
of the wife will increase and labor supply of the husband will decrease as p
increases. Assuming that realized wages and asset income are W, w and A,
the planner￿ s problem is:
max
C;L;c;l;K
b Q(￿(C;L);K) + pb q(!(c;l);K) (44)
s:t: c + C + K + WL + wl ￿ A + W + w = I (45)
Given the weak separability between private goods and the public good in
each spouse￿ s utility function, let Y and y be the expenditure on the wife￿ s




s:t: C + WL ￿ Y (47)
Due to the weak separability, the optimal levels of private goods, C and L,
only depend on W and Y , and are independent of K. We will assume that
the optimal level of L is increasing in Y . The standard restriction on ￿(C;L),
i.e. concavity and ￿LL ￿ ￿CL < 0, that is leisure increases as Y increases, is
su¢ cient. Solving (46) will result in an indirect utility:
e Q(Y;K) (48)




s:t: c + wl ￿ y (50)
Again, the optimal levels of private goods, c and l, only depend on w and
y, and are independent of K. We will assume that the optimal level of l
is increasing in y. The standard restriction on !(c;l), i.e. concavity and
39!ll￿!cl < 0, that is leisure increases as y increases, is su¢ cient. Solving (49)
will result in an indirect utility:
e q(y;K) (51)
All the above implications of (44) and (45) are known from BCM. Assume
that e q(y;K) is increasing and quasi-concave, and e qyK > 0. So we can rewrite
the planner￿ s problem as:
max
Y;y;K
e Q(Y;K) + pe q(y;K) (52)
s:t: Y + y + K ￿ I (53)




R(Y;y;p) = e Q(￿Y;I ￿ y + Y) + pe q(y;I ￿ y + Y) (54)
R(Y;y;p) is supermodular in Y;y;K and p if:
RYy = e QY K ￿ e QKK + p(e qKy ￿ e qKK) > 0 (55)
RYp = e qK > 0 (56)
Ryp = e qy ￿ e qK > 0 (57)
The ￿rst order condition to the planner￿ s problem is:
￿e QY + e QK + pe qK = 0 (58)
￿e QK + p(e qy ￿ e qK) = 0 (59)
(59) implies (57).
(55) and (56) are implied by the assumption that e Q(Y;K) is increasing in
both arguments and quasi-concave in K, and e QY K > 0. An economically
meaningful interpretation is that K is a normal good. In terms of the plan-
ner￿ s primitive objective function (44), a su¢ cient condition is b Q(￿(C;L);K)+
pb q(!(c;l);K) = ￿(C;L)b ￿(K)+p!(c;l)b !(K) for increasing concave functions
b ￿ and b !. Since R(Y;y;p) is supermodular, using the monotone theorem of
Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Y and y are both increasing in p, and thus Y
is decreasing in p. Since L and l are increasing in Y and y respectively, L will
decrease and l will increase as p increases. Thus H and h are increasing and
decreasing in p respectively. See BCM for other implications of the weakly
separable collective model of spousal labor supplies with public goods.
40B.1 Cobb-Douglas preferences
Let the preferences of the husband and the wife be:

















b ￿(K) = K
￿f (65)











l￿ and L￿ are increasing in y and Y respectively as required. The indirect
utilities are:
e Q(Y;K) = ￿fY K
￿f (68)
e q(y;K) = ￿hyK
￿h (69)
for positive constants ￿f and ￿h. R(Y;y;p) is supermodular as required.
Thus l￿ will increase and L￿ will decrease as p increases.
C Proof of Existence of Equilibrium
In the proof, we need:
Eij(p) > 0 as p ! 1 (Condition A1)
Eij(p) < 0 as p ! 0 (Condition A2)
That is, the utility functions q and Q must be such that as p approaches 0,
men will not want to marry. And as p approaches 1, women will not want
41to marry. Let ￿ij = (1 + pij)￿1 where ￿ij 2 [0;1] is the utility weight of the



















> 0; k 6= i (74)
@￿kl(￿)
@pij
= 0; k 6= i;l 6= j (75)
Let ￿ be a matrix with typical element ￿ij and the IxJ matrix function E(￿)
be:
E(￿) = ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿) (76)
An element of E(￿), Eij(￿), is the excess demand for j type wives by i type
men given ￿. An equilibrium exists if there is a ￿￿ such that E(￿￿) = 0.
Assume that there exists a function f(￿) = ￿E(￿) + ￿, ￿ > 0 which maps
[0;1]I￿J ! [0;1]I￿J and is non-decreasing in ￿. Tarsky￿ s ￿xed point theorem
says if a function f(￿) maps [0;k]N ! [0;k]N, k > 0, and is non-decreasing
in ￿, there exists ￿￿ 2 [0;k]N such that ￿￿ = f(￿￿). Let f(￿) = ￿E(￿) + ￿,
k = 1 and N = I￿J, and apply Tarsky￿ s theorem to get ￿￿ = ￿E(￿￿)+￿￿ )
E(￿￿) = 0. Thus the proof of existence reduces to showing f(￿) which has












= 0; k 6= i;l 6= j (80)
(77) to (80) imply that E(￿) satis￿es the Weak Gross Substitutability (WGS)
assumption. We now show that the WGS property of E(￿) implies that we
can construct f(￿), such that f(￿) maps [0;1]I￿J ! [0;1]I￿J and is non-
decreasing in ￿. The proof follows the solution to exercise 17.F.16C of Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green given in their solution manual (Hara, Segal and
Tadelis, 1996). N.B. Unlike them, we do not start with Gross Substitution, we
begin from WGS, but it turns out to be su¢ cient for Tarsky￿ s conditions. For
notational convenience, now onwards we￿ ll treat the matrix function E(￿),
as a vector function. Let N = I ￿ J and 1N be a N ￿ 1 vector of ones.
E(￿) : [0;1]N ! RN is continuously di⁄erentiable and satis￿es E(0N) >> 0N
and E(1N) << 0N (Conditions A1 and A2). For every ￿ 2 [0;1]N and any
n, if ￿n = 0, then En(￿) > 0. For every ￿ 2 [0;1]N and any n, if ￿n = 1,
then En(￿) < 0. If ￿ = f0N;1Ng, the facts follow from Conditions A1
and A2. Otherwise, they are due to Conditions A1 and A2, and (77) to
(80), i.e. WGS. For each n, de￿ne Cn = f￿ 2 [0;1]N : En(￿) ￿ 0g and
Dn = f￿ 2 [0;1]N : En(￿) ￿ 0g. Then Cn ￿ f￿ 2 [0;1]N : ￿n < 1g
and Dn ￿ f￿ 2 [0;1]N : ￿n > 0g. Then by continuity, the following two
minima, ij((1 ￿ ￿n)=En(￿) : ￿ 2 Cn) and ij(￿￿n=En(￿) : ￿ 2 Dn), exist and
are positive. Let ￿
n > 0 be smaller than those two minima. Then, for all
￿ 2 (0;￿
n) and any ￿ 2 [0;1]N, we have 0 ￿ ￿En(￿) + ￿n ￿ 1. For each n,












￿ 0;n 6= m; follows from (77) to (80).
43Now let K = ijf￿
1;::;￿
N;1=L1;::;1=LNg, choose ￿ 2 (0;K), then f(￿) =
￿E(￿) + ￿ 2 [0;1]N and @f(￿)=@￿n ￿ 0 for every ￿ 2 [0;1]N, and any n.
Hence Tarsky￿ s conditions are satis￿ed.
44Table 1: Summary statistics (2000 US census) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
          
INDIVIDUAL 
T(i,j,s) 746943 -.0027757 .5425194 -3.60296  3.03591 
SR(i,j,s) 746943 -.003512  .4543587 -3.017524  2.338186
SR(age,s) 746943 -.0277066 .0823402 -.4369596  .3772942
SR(race,s) 746943 -.0037428 .0799888 -.4177496  .5132542
SR(educ,s) 746943 -.0237409 .4472689 -1.593234  1.491079
SR(s) 746943 -.0246046 .0460074 -.1440098  .173324 
 
CELL AVERAGE 
T(i,j,s) 2998  -.1293465 .9615514 -3.416714  2.48425 
SR(i,j,s) 2998  -.0779628 .8426416 -2.847724  2.157963
SR(educ,s) 2998  -.0332998 .6369095 -1.593234  1.491079
SR(race,s) 2998  -.0558353 .134684  -.4177496  .5132542
SR(age,s) 2998  -.0211743 .1003443 -.4369596  .3426507
SR(s) 2998  -.0253774 .0542566 -.1440098  .173324 
Black 2998  .2731821  .4456679 0  1 
White 2998  .5376918  .4986605 0  1 
Hispanic 2998  .1891261  .3916741 0  1 
Age M  2998  2.528686  1.095542 1  4 
Age F  2998  2.531354  1.043363 1  4 
High school M  2998  .554036  .4971545 0  1 
High school F  2998  .5483656  .4977383 0  1 
LFPR M  2998  .918946  .2729636 0  1 
LFPR F  2998  .7461641  .4352774 0  1 
Ln odds LFP F         2894  1.109142  .6913693 1.791759 3.540959
Ln odds LFP M         2518  2.601714  .9234381 .4054651 5.451038
Ln hrs/wk M  2868  3.787856  .2626683 1.386294 4.59512 
Ln hrs/wk F  2336  3.557191  .4330918 0 4.564348
Ln wks/yr M  2868  3.870028  .2888853 1.098612 3.951244
Ln wks/yr F  2336  3.69982  .5736629 0 3.951244
Mean ln earn M  2998  10.16656  .3120247 9.081255  11.16829
Mean ln earn F  2998  9.937329  .3475555 8.290825  10.89547
Frac earn zero M  2998  .1150971  .075068  0  .4883721
Frac earn zero F  2998  .1114505  .0693188 0  .3673469
SD ln earn M  2998  .8329061  .1378765 .299653  1.857046
SD ln earn F  2998  .8318596  .1413075 .1315346  1.901179
Mean ln asset M  2994  7.46694  .5156904 4.493598  10.10028
Mean ln asset F  2994  7.459356  .5812731 4.877075  11.11245
SD ln asset M  2982  2.001771  .3480703 .0330005  4.720074
SD ln asset F  2992  1.823201  .340452  .1246987  3.480812
Frac asset zero M  2998  .6944602  .1316078 .2222222  1 
Frac asset zero F  2998  .611422  .1078636 .183908  1 Table 2: Determinants of market tightness (P value of F test) 
Observations  2998 2395 2395 2395 
R-squared  0.013 0.876 0.891 0.913 
State  0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Instruments   0.00  0.00  0.00 
Labor market      0.00  0.00 
M ages, edu        0.00 
F ages, edu        0.00 
Race       0.00 
 
Table 3: Controlling for SR(i,j,s), P value of F test of coefficients of other sex ratio measures, SR(age,s), 
SR(race,s), SR(edu,s), being different from zero. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV 
        
SR(i,j,s)  X X X X X X 
Other SR (race, age, edu)  X  X  X  X  X  X 
States  X X X X X X 
Labor  market  conditions    X X   X X 
M  effects    X    X 
F  effects    X    X 
        
Observations  2894 2873 2873 2330 2330 2330 
R-squared 0.363  0.445 0.509 0.418 0.497 0.527
Log odds LFP F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
        
Observations  2849 2838 2838 2322 2322 2322 
R-squared 0.350  0.417 0.450 0.428 0.496 0.518
Ln hrs/wk F  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.06 
        
Observations  2518 2503 2503 2083 2083 2083 
R-squared 0.176  0.563 0.657 0.330 0.573 0.634
Ln wks/yr F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.23 
        
Observations  2518 2503 2503 2083 2083 2083 
R-squared 0.176  0.563 0.657 0.330 0.573 0.634
Log odds LFP M  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.23 
        
Observations  2970 2951 2951 2380 2380 2380 
R-squared 0.162  0.273 0.288 0.251 0.331 0.294
Ln hrs/wks M  0.00  0.01  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.42 
        
Observations  2970 2951 2951 2380 2380 2380 
R-squared 0.073  0.159 0.181 0.098 0.166 0.163
Ln wks/yr M  0.00  0.40  0.10  0.00  0.12  0.43 Table 4a: Effects of market tightness on log odds of labor force participation of wives     
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV IV 
T(i,j,s) 0.232  -0.196  -0.184  0.330  -0.176  -0.665  -0.167 
 (0.014)**  (0.024)**  (0.030)**  (0.016)**  (0.032)**  (0.209)**  (0.065)** 
SR(i,j,s)       0.537   
       (0.229)*   
Observations  2894 2873 2873 2330 2330 2330 2330 
R-squared  0.170 0.391 0.485 0.229 0.480 0.473 0.545 
States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Labor  mark    0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
M  type    0.00     0.00 
F  type    0.00     0.00 
 
Table 4b: Effects of market tightness on log hours per weeks of wives         
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV IV 
T(i,j,s) 0.027  -0.026  -0.024  0.037  -0.028  -0.089  -0.044 
 (0.002)**  (0.004)**  (0.005)**  (0.002)**  (0.005)**  (0.031)**  (0.010)** 
SR(i,j,s)       0.068   
       (0.034)*   
Observations  2849 2838 2838 2322 2322 2322 2322 
R-squared  0.173 0.405 0.445 0.248 0.499 0.489 0.525 
States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Labor  mark    0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
M  type    0.00     0.00 
F  type    0.00     0.00 
 
Table 4c: Effects of market tightness on log annual weeks of wives          
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV IV 
T(i,j,s) 0.018  -0.023  -0.016  0.022  -0.022  0.011  -0.014 
 (0.003)**  (0.005)**  (0.007)*  (0.003)**  (0.007)**  (0.042)  (0.014) 
SR(i,j,s)       -0.037   
       (0.046)   
Observations  2849 2838 2838 2322 2322 2322 2322 
R-squared  0.071 0.145 0.185 0.097 0.170 0.172 0.205 
States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Labor  mark   0.00  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00 
M  type    0.25     0.26 
F  type    0.00     0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Table 5a: Effects of market tightness on log odds labor force participation of husbands     
  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV IV IV 
T(i,j,s) -0.018  0.067  -0.015  -0.034  0.145  1.680  0.015 
  (0.018) (0.029)* (0.037) (0.019)  (0.041)**  (0.260)**  (0.072) 
SR(i,j,s)         -1.695   
         (0.285)**   
Observations  2518 2503  2503 2083 2083  2083  2083 
R-squared  0.067 0.561  0.652 0.138 0.582  0.536  0.645 
States  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Labor  mark   0.00  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00 
M  type     0.00       0.00 
F  type    0.07       0.20 
 
Table 5b: Effects of market tightness on log hours per weeks of husbands         
  
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV IV IV 
T(i,j,s) -0.001  0.012  0.004  -0.003  0.018  0.102  -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.003)** (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003)**  (0.026)**  (0.008) 
SR(i,j,s)         -0.092   
         (0.029)**   
Observations  2970  2951 2951  2380  2380 2380 2380 
R-squared  0.064  0.269 0.286  0.095  0.330 0.289 0.343 
States  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Labor  mark    0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.01 
M  type     0.11      0.02 
F  type     0.51      0.80 
 
Table 5c: Effects of market tightness on log annual weeks of husbands         
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
  OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  IV 
T(i,j,s)  0.000 0.003 -0.003  -0.001  0.011  0.071  -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)  (0.005)*  (0.031)*  (0.010) 
SR(i,j,s)        -0.066   
        (0.034)   
Observations  2970 2951 2951 2380 2380  2380  2380 
R-squared  0.045 0.158 0.176 0.061 0.175  0.155  0.194 
States  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Labor  mark    0.00 0.00   0.00  0.00  0.23 
M  type    0.92       0.30 
F  type   0.05       0.53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       Table 6: Sample Statistics for the 2000 US Census and the
2003 American Time Use Survey






Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
College graduate 0.6634 0.6653 0.4398 0.4812
Participation rate 0.9412 0.7269
Usual weekly hours 44.9972 34.1112
Weeks per year 48.6386 41.4128
Weekly housework 10.3 15.5
Observations 746,908 408
1Table 7: Time use results for men and women
Sex Ratio Tightness Instrument
Tightness Observations
Women
Leisure 3.3036 0.9074 2.1089 94
(14.2688) (15.9733) (15.8214)
Home Production -0.7615 -0.8015 -0.8055 81
(0.5968) (0.5237) (0.5647)
Men
Leisure -25.8676 -33.4539 1.3333 72
(19.8472) (20.8519) (23.4958)
Home Production 3.1593 2.6557 2.6557 48
(2.4134) (2.9029) (2.9029)
State controls No No No
Labor market controls Yes Yes Yes
Match-speci￿c controls No No No
Race controls Yes Yes Yes
Age and education controls Yes Yes Yes
2Determinants  of  market  tightness          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Lcolpw_f   0.204  0.213  0.076 
  (0.031)**  (0.033)**  (0.036)* 
lcolpw_m   -0.062  -0.033  -0.078 
  (0.057)  (0.055)  (0.051) 
lcolmw_f   0.042  0.028  0.093 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.029)** 
lcolmw_m   -0.131  -0.112  -0.111 
  (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.098) 
dlcolpw_f   -0.245  -0.203  -0.218 
  (0.039)**  (0.039)**  (0.035)** 
dlcolpw_m   0.563  0.472  0.398 
  (0.094)**  (0.092)**  (0.084)** 
Dlcolmw_f   -0.200  -0.144  -0.218 
  (0.037)**  (0.037)**  (0.038)** 
Dlcolmw_m   0.205  0.196  0.350 
  (0.074)**  (0.075)**  (0.127)** 
lhspw_f   0.207  0.253  0.106 
  (0.089)*  (0.085)**  (0.084) 
lhspw_m   0.153  0.254  0.303 
  (0.175)  (0.172)  (0.159) 
lhsmw_f   -0.199  -0.233  -0.112 
  (0.091)*  (0.089)**  (0.094) 
lhsmw_m   -0.536  -0.509  -0.540 
  (0.407)  (0.420)  (0.522) 
dlhspw_f   0.465  0.425  0.142 
  (0.195)*  (0.208)*  (0.186) 
dlhspw_m   -0.556  -0.662  -0.449 
  (0.325)  (0.317)*  (0.274) 
Dlhsmw_f   -0.614  -0.340  -0.349 
  (0.410)  (0.409)  (0.403) 
Dlhsmw_m   2.052  1.895  2.429 
  (0.597)**  (0.591)**  (0.846)** 
Lmweight   0.143  0.118  0.039 
  (0.022)**  (0.021)**  (0.027) 
Lfweight   -0.113  -0.102  -0.092 
  (0.025)**  (0.026)**  (0.031)** 
M avg learn      -0.708  0.289 
   (0.133)**  (0.143)* 
F avg learn      0.545  0.277 
   (0.109)**  (0.156) 
M zero earn      -0.580  1.798 
   (0.361)  (0.339)** 
F zero earn      -0.879  -0.968 
   (0.412)*  (0.390)* 
M sd learn      -0.194  0.161 
   (0.175)  (0.184) 
F sd learn      0.263  0.115 
   (0.152)  (0.147) 
M avg lasset      -0.166  -0.013 
   (0.034)**  (0.032) 
F avg lasset      0.150  0.095    (0.041)**  (0.044)* 
M sd lasset      -0.176  -0.104 
   (0.056)**  (0.049)* 
F sd lasset      0.108  0.084 
   (0.088)  (0.080) 
m_asset_zero     -0.330  -0.729 
   (0.215)  (0.230)** 
f_asset_zero     0.370  0.554 
   (0.212)  (0.196)** 
     
Observations  2998 2395 2395 2395 
R-squared  0.013 0.876 0.891 0.913 
State  0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Instru   0.00  0.00  0.00 
Unmar earn      0.00  0.00 
M  type     0.00 
F  type     0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
Lcolpw_f : log fraction college educated father for j type women. 
Lcolpw_m : log fraction college educated father for i type men. 
lcolmw_f : log fraction college educated mother for j type women. 
lcolmw_m : log fraction college educated mother for i type men. 
dLcolpw_f = Lcolpw_f*college educated type j women. 
dLcolpw_m = Lcolpw_m*college educated type i men.  
dLcolmw_f = Lcolpw_f*college educated type j women. 
dLcolmw_m = Lcolpw_m*college educated type i men. 
 lhspw_f : log fraction high school graduate father for j type women. 
lhspw_m : log fraction high school graduate father for i type men. 
lhsmw_f : log fraction high school graduate mother for j type women. 
lhsw_m : log fraction high school graduate mother for i type men. 
d lhspw_f = lhspw_f *college educated type j women. 
dLhspw_m = Lhspw_m*college educated type i men.  
dLhsmw_f = Lhspw_f*college educated type j women. 
dLhsmw_m = Lhsmw_m*college educated type i men. 
Lmweight: log number of type I men (by race and age) in 1960 or 1970. 
Lfweight: log number of type j women (by race and age) in 1960 or 1970. 
M avg learn: average type I unmarried log labor earnings. 
F avg learn: average type j unmarried log labor earnings. 
M zero earn: Fraction type I umarried with zero labor earnings. 
F zero earn: Fraction type j umarried with zero labor earnings. 
M avg lassets: average type I unmarried log non labor earnings. 
F avg lassets: average type j unmarried log non labor earnings. 
M zero assets: Fraction type I umarried with zero non labor earnings. 
F zero assets: Fraction type j umarried with zero non labor earnings. 
M SD learn: Standard deviation type I unmarried log labor earnings. 
F SD learn: Standard deviation type j unmarried log labor earnings. 
M SD lassets: Standard deviation type I unmarried log non labor earnings. 
F SD lassets: Standard deviation type j unmarried log non labor earnings. 
 